Before a first payment to a new payee, many UK banking apps now check whether the name you typed matches the name on the receiving account. This article explains how that service, Confirmation of Payee, works, how far it reaches, and why a regulatory deadline on 1 November 2026 has brought it back into focus.
What is Confirmation of Payee?
Confirmation of Payee (CoP) is a name-checking service. When you set up a payment to a new recipient, you enter a name along with a sort code and account number. Your bank asks the recipient’s bank whether those details belong together, and then tells you what it found before you confirm the payment.
The Payment Systems Regulator (PSR) describes it as a service that aims to prevent some authorised push payment (APP) scams and accidentally misdirected payments. APP scams are those in which a victim is tricked into authorising a transfer themselves. A name check addresses one specific weakness in that process: bank transfers have long been routed using only the sort code and account number, so a wrong digit or a fraudster’s account could look perfectly normal on screen.
CoP is operated as a Pay.UK service. According to the PSR, Pay.UK sets its rules and standards, while the regulator uses legal directions to require firms to take part.
How does the check work in practice?
The sequence is quick and mostly invisible. In outline:
- You enter the payee’s name and account details in your banking app or online banking.
- Your bank sends a request to the bank that holds the receiving account.
- The receiving bank compares the name with the one it has on record.
- Your bank shows you the outcome, and you decide whether to go ahead.
Banks typically present the outcome as a clear match, a near match with a suggested correction, or a mismatch, and some checks cannot be completed at all. The wording and screens differ between providers, so it is worth reading the message rather than clicking through it. The point of the design is that the final decision stays with the sender, who gets better information at the moment it matters most.
How did the rules spread across the industry?
The requirement arrived in stages, which the PSR’s published documents set out.
| Date | Step |
|---|---|
| August 2019 | Specific Direction 10 required the six largest banking groups to implement CoP |
| March 2020 | The PSR directed the largest retail banks to adopt the service |
| 11 October 2022 | Specific Direction 17 (SD17) extended the requirement to around 400 payment service providers |
| After 31 October 2023 | Group 1 firms had to have a CoP system able to send and respond to checks |
| After 31 October 2024 | Group 2 firms, mostly those with their own sort codes or building societies using a particular reference type, had to do the same |
When it made the 2022 direction, the PSR explained that the first group was prioritised because of the size of the firms and the likely immediate impact on APP scams. It estimated that this would raise coverage of Faster Payments transactions from 92% to 99%. The regulator also said it wanted everyone to have the same levels of protection and confidence when paying, regardless of who they transact with.
How widely is it used?
The PSR said in October 2024 that hundreds more firms had adopted CoP, so that over 99% of Faster Payments and CHAPS transactions were covered. It added that more than 2.5 billion checks had been completed since the service launched in 2020.
In its compliance report on SD17, published on 18 November 2025, the PSR said over 320 organisations offer CoP checks in the UK and that over 99% of organisations initiating Faster Payments transactions offer them. It also reported more than 2 million checks completed each day.
A quick piece of illustrative arithmetic puts that in perspective: 2 million checks a day over 365 days is about 730 million checks a year. For most people the service is therefore not an occasional safeguard but part of the routine of sending money, a point that echoes the habits discussed in how digital payments change consumer behaviour.
Why does 1 November 2026 matter?
SD17 contains a fixed expiry date of 1 November 2026. In July 2026 the PSR published a consultation paper, CP26/2, which proposed to remove that date so that the direction continues in force. According to the consultation, the comment deadline was 20 August 2026.
The paper also asked whether the direction should be widened to cover all payment service providers that currently offer CoP, including those that adopted it voluntarily. One draft option created a “Group 3” of firms with a compliance date of 31 December 2026. It also asked whether the direction should be subject to review within five years, and whether any expansion should instead be made by general direction rather than by amending SD17.
These are proposals, and they could change after consultation. Readers should check the PSR’s website for the regulator’s final decision. The underlying logic is straightforward: a protection that is voluntary for some firms leaves gaps, and a requirement that lapses on a set date risks leaving the service without a legal basis.
What happens when a firm does not comply?
Enforcement is not hypothetical. On 19 February 2026 the PSR announced that it had concluded an investigation into Bank of Ireland UK and imposed a fine of over £3.7 million for failing to comply with SD17. The PSR’s decision notice, dated the same day, sets out its findings.
The case shows that the directions have teeth. It also illustrates why the regulator monitors adoption: according to the compliance report, since the October 2024 deadline the PSR has tracked compliance rates and has been addressing the issues it identified.
Does a matching name mean a payment is safe?
No, and this is the most important limit of the service. CoP confirms that a name and an account are linked. It does not confirm that the person behind the account is honest or that the goods or services you are paying for exist.
Consider a worked example. A homeowner receives an invoice, supposedly from a builder, with a new account number. They type the builder’s name, and the check returns a match because a fraudster has opened an account in a similar business name. The check has done what it was designed to do, yet the money is still going to the wrong person. Equally, a mismatch does not prove fraud. Business accounts can be held under a trading name or a legal name, and a small spelling difference may be innocent.
Scammers also adapt. A check on the payee’s name does nothing about pressure tactics, fake urgency or impersonation of a bank’s fraud team. In those cases the safest habit is to pause, and to verify any change of payment details through a contact number you already trust.
How does it fit with fraud reimbursement and open banking?
CoP sits alongside, rather than instead of, other protections. It aims to prevent a bad payment; reimbursement rules deal with the aftermath. The PSR’s mandatory reimbursement requirement for Faster Payments APP scams is examined in APP fraud reimbursement: what the evidence shows. Neither removes the value of caution at the point of payment, and the mechanics of the underlying rails are covered in how modern bank transfers work.
Data-sharing services built on open banking, described in what open banking means for UK consumers, serve a different purpose. They move information with the customer’s permission, while CoP verifies a payee before money moves.
What to watch after the deadline
The practical effect for most customers will be small: the name check should carry on appearing as it does now. What matters is the regulatory certainty behind it. If the PSR confirms the proposals, the requirement will no longer lapse on a set date, and more firms may be brought formally within scope.
Longer term, the more interesting question is how far a name check can go. It tackles misdirected payments and a particular kind of impersonation, but it cannot see intent. It works best as one layer in a set of defences, and it is only as useful as the attention a sender pays to its result.
This is general information, not personalised financial advice. Rules, deadlines and figures change, so check current details with your bank and the regulator.
Sources: Payment Systems Regulator
